Ponderous Ponderer

Christopher Hitchens Answered

c.2007.11.24
ed.2010.03.03.09 (Public Draft I)

Organization
1. The Challenge
2. A Response
3. A Logical Validation
4. Assumptions
5. Issues of Validity

1. The Challenge
When I heard this challenge offered by Christopher Hitchens in a debate with Alister McGrath that took place at Georgetown, I couldn't stop my mind from boiling over into a bubbling froth of incredulity. How is it that Christopher Hitchens can claim that no one presented a valid answer to him? This is exceptionally difficult for me to believe and became the inspiration for this article.

“Name an ethical statement or action, made or performed by a person of faith, that could not have been made or performed by a nonbeliever." -Christopher Hitchens

Hitchens stated this challenge with the apparent intent to argue that if there was a moral act that could only be accomplished by the religious, then it could be reasonably asserted that religion has something valuable to offer to society:

2. A Response
Any moral action that is religious and requires belief by definition excludes all unbelievers. This challenge can be fulfilled so long as it can be shown that there is at least one moral action that: is religious, and requires belief in God.

A moral action that a religious person can perform that an unbeliever cannot is to: “Give faithful testimony of God.”

"Faithful Testimony" is a true and consistent verbal testimony, (as in a court), of God before others concerning what He has said or done, (especially what He is saying or doing). This testimony is given credibility by an individual's faithfulness and obedience to God.

Jewish and Christian references that this is a religious action:

Leviticus 5:1 (ESV)
If anyone sins in that he hears a public adjuration to testify, and though he is a witness, whether he has seen or come to know the matter, yet does not speak, he shall bear his iniquity ...

Deuteronomy 26:17 (ESV)
You have declared today that the LORD is your God, and that you will walk in his ways, and keep his statutes and his commandments and his rules, and will obey his voice.

Hebrews 3:5 (ESV)
Now Moses was faithful in all God’s house as a servant, to testify to the things that were to be spoken later ...

3. A Logical Validation

Argument:

  1. A religious person is someone who: 1, Walks in the Ways of God; 2, Keeps His Statutes; 3, Keeps His Commandments; 4, Keeps His Rules; and 5, Obeys His Voice. (Deut.26:17).
  2. "Giving Testimony of God" is a religious act: "If anyone sins in that he hears a public adjuration to testify, and though he is a witness, whether he has seen or come to know the matter, yet does not speak, he shall bear his iniquity", (Lev. 5:1, ESV).
  3. It is impossible to consider true and faithful testimony as an immoral act regardless of who is being testified of; giving testimony is an ethical and moral action because it facilitates justice.
  4. It is impossible for a true witness of God to give faithful, (true) testimony without believing that God "is"; this act excludes unbelievers.
  5. It is impossible for a religious person to separate their testimony of God and faithfulness: "You have declared today that the LORD is your God, and that you will walk in his ways, and keep his statutes and his commandments and his rules, and will obey his voice", (Deut. 26:16, ESV).

Conclusion:
A moral action that a religious person can perform that an unbeliever cannot is to “Give faithful testimony of God while their credibility is established through their obedience to His commands.”

4. Assumptions

Assumption 1:
My interpretation of Hitchens' challenge:
  1. If there were a moral action that only the religious could perform, then it could be seen as reasonable for people to be religious.
  2. If you cannot name such an action, then there must not be one.
  3. Therefore, since there is no moral action that only the religious can perform, then religion does not provide any moral value to society.

Assumption 2:
I can only assume that Hitchens is expecting religious actions to be presented. After all, it is not believing that God exists that Hitchens is attacking--in this context. He is arguing that religion provides no benefit to society; and, further that if this is true, then it is simply "toxic".

Hitchens is evidently attacking religion and the religious. In the end, there is a very big difference between being religious, and those who just simply believe that God exists.

Assumption 3:
There are many very obvious examples of ethical actions that a believer can make that an unbeliever cannot if we were to consider Hitchens' use of "ethical" in the classical sense implying "custom or habit".

Because large populations on Earth are made of believers, this makes nearly every religious action, "ethical" by definition. This readily excludes unbelievers.

Therefore, I always refer to Hitchens' use of the word "ethics" as "morality", (in the ssense that the action is "good", "right", and "just"), in order to differentiate that which could be considered ethical, but not necessarily moral, (for example, slavery was at one time considered ethical despite it truly being immoral; morality differs from ethics in that morality transcends time).

5. Issues of Validity

The Awareness of Morality:
Hitchens' hastily generalizes and mischaracterizes believers by arguing that the religious believe that: "unbelievers "would not know right from wrong if [they were] not supernaturally guided by a celestial dictatorship".

Believers for the most part argue that the ability to discern right from wrong is inherent in all people; and, this inner quality is what is exclusive to humanity and what leads them to the knowledge of God. This belief by Jews and Christians is established primarily upon the act of Adam eating from the tree of "Knowledge of Good and Evil". From this point on, it is argued that we are all well aware of the difference between right and wrong.

Furthermore, our religions are not mechanisms to define moral behavior. Neither Morality or Truth are dependent on Men to define them. It is impossible for religion to define Morality. Rather, religion, (obedience and adherence), is our response to apparent morality.

The Justification of Religion:
Religion cannot be justified by simply providing a prescription to do moral deeds. Simple reason and conviction of heart can guide us into undeniably moral and good actions, (such as feeding the hungry).

The justification of religion has never been its view towards morality, but its destination in God. The clearest measuring stick of the validity of a religion is an individual's evidentual intimacy with God.

Argument From Silence
If you cannot name such an action, then there must not be one.

Although Hitchens does not directly make this statement, this implied conclusion is based on silence and the lack of contrary evidence. Just because he or anyone else is ignorant of a truth, doesn't not mean that this truth does not exist.

Hitchens presupposes that there is no contrary evidence and therefore feels his conclusion is justified.

26 comments:

Anonymous said...

Wow! Preach it brother :)

Anonymous said...

Well, I'm disappointed in you. I thought we had quite the productive discussion going, and now you not only delete it, but you repost your original argument as though there never were a discussion.

It's one thing to disagree with someone; it's quite another to pretend that positions you disagree with don't exist.

e.s. kohen said...

I apologize about that, I really do...

All of our comments are here: http://elikakohen.wordpress.com/2007/11/24/christopher-hitchens-answered/

I have no clue how to get these comments back on blogger..

I was attempting to migrate over to WordPress and then I found out how horribly it does Domain Name configurations. (I can't use the DNS hosting services that I already have and I certainly don't want to use WordPress' DNS services. :(

Again, I apologize for the mess.

e.s. kohen said...

P.S.

You do realize that I have no clue who you are right? :D

Anonymous said...

I am the person you were having a particular discussion with. Beyond that, do any other facts about me matter?

As for technical difficulties in migration, while I have no expertise to assist you in that matter, I would imagine it wouldn't be too difficult to at least acknowledge that a difference of opinion existed, but was lost due to technical difficulties.

Which, of course, you've now done.

jens said...

I think Hitchens challenge is only supposed to prove that religious belief is not necessary for ethical behaviour. As a logical arguement, it can not do any more, as it applies to absolutely all systems of belief:

The same challenge can be put to any odd belief system as thus:

"Name me an ethical statement made or an action performed by a believer [in A] that could not have been made or performed by a non-believer [in A]"

With Hitchens in mind, one may insert [the values of the secular enlightenment as held by Paine and Jefferson in particular] for [A] and he could not meet the challenge himself.

The challenge can can of course be met by any odd belief system with:

"Let [a] be an action that is only (or mainly) considered ethical by adherents of [A], then [a] meets the above challenge."

Again, all system of belief are on the same footing, as they can all produce a response in a trivial sort of way.

The anti religious force lies in the fact that religious people sometimes claim their system of belief (or a subset thereof that is exclusive to them) to be necessary for ethics. Basically, the argument in Brothers Karamazov.

Atheists usually do not claim any necessity for any exclusive parts of whatever we derive our ethics from.

I believe that is all the challenge does or can do: prove that no system of belief is strictly necessary to ethics. And atheists have less trouble accepting that than at least some religious people.

e.s. kohen said...

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Jens Said
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The anti religious force lies in the fact that religious people sometimes claim their system of belief (or a subset thereof that is exclusive to them) to be necessary for ethics. Basically, the argument in Brothers Karamazov.

Atheists usually do not claim any necessity for any exclusive parts of whatever we derive our ethics from.

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e.s. Response
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You say that "religious people sometimes claim their system of belief (or a subset thereof that is exclusive to them) to be necessary for ethics."

This is precisely why I claim that Hitchens' argument is a "Strawman".

What Judeo-Christian denomination makes this assertion? Is there any faith that does that would cause Hitchens to make this claim in the first place? (I saw your reference to the Brothers, but that perception is a hasty generalizing all of the rest of us, which is actually offensive).

All of the Judeo-Christian Scriptural texts, (I made references to several passages), claim the EXACT opposite.

If you make a case on a completely erroneous argument like Hitchens does, then there is no rational reason why that argument should even be entertained.

He creates an imaginary position that the religious claim, and then tries to disprove it. STRAWMAN.

Hope this makes more sense. I really do appreciate your thoughts!

jens said...

Thank you for the response.

I agree with you that it is knocking down a strawman. I didnt mean to imply the generalization that you rightly reject. It is, after all, telling that this position is referred to by naming book of fiction.

While the challenge by religious people on the foundations of our ethics often does resemble the Brothers Karamazov question, I think this is just for the sake of brevity. The intention is not to actually claim that we can not have any ethics but rather a simple request to spell it out so that it can be discussed. Afterall, atheists can have a wide range of very different positions on ethics, so it is a fair request. In any case, taking the debate in that direction is a lot more fruitful than deliberately misunderstanding it.

But Hitchens is not so much a philosopher as a polemicist engaged in Americas culture war (which is very strange but fascinating to me. I live in Germany where nothing is ever publicly debated with that much passion or controversy). So, I take his challenge as a punchline used for political effect. In a context where an admission of atheism amounts to political suicide, I think it is fair game. On the philosophical merits of it, I agree with you.

Mike said...

Wow, fantastic circular logic bro.

You can't cite an appeal to God as a moral practice when it is such belief you are trying to validate in the first place.

e.s. kohen said...

Mike Said:
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Wow, fantastic circular logic bro.

You can't cite an appeal to God as a moral practice when it is such belief you are trying to validate in the first place.

e.k. response
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You kind of hit the point of my argument. The challenge is in itself circular. Hitchens is asking for a "religious action" which by definition requires an appeal to God if that action is to be considered religious, (religious meaning something done in obedience to God).

Hitchens is asking for an example of either a religious or non-religious action.

Since he has stipulated that he is looking for an action that an unbeliever could not perform, then Hitchens is evidentally looking for an action that requires "belief in God", (which by definition means that the action is religious).

However, I would still like to know why you would consider my argument circular. Is there anyway that you could summarize the premises and conclusion which illustrates its circularity? Actually, I would appreciate it a lot.

I really have no problem resolving the issue, and updating the response. I have already done this in view of feedback that I have received in the past.

Thanks!

Retha said...

This is an old post on my blog and yours, but perhaps you would be interested. You say Hitchens is making a circular argument. I say he is misleading- the only kind of response that would possibly count is one he would reject as "that is not moral." Here is the post on how I see it:

http://christianrethinker.wordpress.com/2009/05/10/meeting-the-hitchens-challenge-easy

e.s. kohen said...

Retha Said:
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You say Hitchens is making a circular argument.

Elika Kohen Response:
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I am not really claiming that he made a circular argument. I haven't been convinced of that yet, because I can't clearly see the circular argument form that the other commentor claimed, (yet).

Retha Said:
@ http://christianrethinker.wordpress.com/2009/05/10/meeting-the-hitchens-challenge-easy
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"The point, presumably, is to say that atheists are ethically the same as believers, at least."

Elika Kohen Response:
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Hey, thanks for the response to my post on his challenge: http://www.kohen.com/2008/06/christopher-hitchens-answered.html

Though, I am not sure if I agree with your thesis in your response. Then again, I really didn't consider his argument in this light. So, you got me thinking.

I don't think he was attacking believers, and I don't think he was arguing that believers are /not/ ethically superior ... (In this argument, anyway).

I think his point was more along the lines of the "value of religion". Is there any ethical action that religion teaches us, that we can't do without belief?" If so, then there is a benefit to religion AND belief.

If religion doesn't teach us anything new AND religion isn't required in order to perform these actions, then those that are religious, and believing, really don't have any "advantage" when it comes to ethics. And, I think, he would argue that people should stop claiming that religion should serve as a guiding light when it comes to morality and ethics.

Unfortunately, from my view point, Hitchens is making a strawman argument, ignoring something that both Jews and Christians claim: Morality is apparent, to act morally doesn't take a divine experience. But this law is written on our hearts, (Biblically, heart always referred to thoughts/mind). And, this truth is readily apparent.

From your point of view, if he really is trying to determine whether or not one set of people are more moral statistically than another set in order to come to some great philosophical conclusion, then he is making all kinds of logical falacies.

e.s. kohen said...

Everyone:

A year or so ago, I tried transferring my blog to wordpress, and then back again, I lost SO many awesome comments about this particular topic, by one particular anonymous user.

IF YOU KNOW WHO I AM TALKING ABOUT, I AM OFFERING A REWARD!

No, I haven't figured out what kind of reward it will be, maybe a jug of ice cream. Or maybe a first edition of my unpublished book! Woot! Okay, that edition bites. Second edition? Still unpublished. ;)

HAH.

ANYHOO.

I have HEREBY DUBBED SAID USER AS "EUTHYPRO". I am going to try, painstakingly to reconstruct our conversation. In hopes that I can find said Guru again.

:D Hopefully, you will see why I admired their comments. :)

e.s. kohen said...

e.s formerly said:
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Again I apologize for my tardiness. I just moved to the other side of the planet, (roughly).

"Euthypro" Said:
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If belief isn't the distinction between a believer and a non-believer, then what else possibly could be?

e.s.
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The distinction between a believer and a non-believer--in this context--is obedience, not belief.

Hitchens is evidentally using the terms "believer" and "religious individual" interchangeably.


This is a rather extreme analogy, but I hope this clarifies this point:

A Demon and a "Follower" both believe that God exists, but only the "Follower" obeys.

A Demon and an Unbeliever both disobey what God commands, but only the Demon believes.

It is possible for a person to believe in God and not be religious, (not be obedient to God).

If a believing person truthfully states that God exists, they perform a moral action. However, this action bears no direct relationship with religion. Therefore, this action cannot be considered to be an example of how religion benefits society since the action only requires belief and not obedience.



"Euthypro" Said:
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e.s.
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Anon Said:
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"'Hey, atheist-Bob, this is my gold statue, his name is God'.
"'Oh, hey believer-Sam, and hello to you as well, God.'"

Based on your definition, anyone could truthfully (believing it to be so) state that leprechauns exist, or the flying spaghetti monster, or anything. But I think that sort of definition turns telling the truth into a meaningless term, and I don't think that is what you want to do.


e.s.
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This is exactly the point, "Truthfully stating that God exists" is meaningless from a religious point of view if there is no obedience.

So, if we rephrase your question differently, "Does truthfully stating 'God Exists' fulfill Hitchens challenge if the speaker is personally convicted, (convinced without reasonable doubt) concerning its truth?"

I can rephrase this one step further, "If only a believer can truthfully states that 'God Exists', does truthfully stating "God exists" fulfill Hitchens challenge?"

Well, it excludes unbelievers by definition and it is a moral action.

However, it does not seem to be a religious action. If Satan or demons can perform this action, then it does not seem that this action is exclusive to the religious/adherrent.

It is exclusive to believers. But, it is not exclusive to the religious.

Only if it is exclusive to the religious, does it seem to fulfill Hitchens' challenge by exclusively associating a moral action to religion.

If the action is not exclusively religious, I do not see how it could fulfill the requirements of Hitchens' challenge.

e.s. kohen said...

YAY! I found it. The last argument of Euthypro! I have been going through an old email data file I found trying to reconstruct his argument... but I can't even repost his comments because of their size, (I think blogspot changed their constraints.)

Anyhoo. The last paragraph is VERY important, and something we never really addressed.

Euthypro Said:
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Perhaps more significantly, I don't think this is a good analogy to your proposed action. A better one, perhaps, would be giving someone a meal one day, then several years later choosing not to give a different, but equally deserving, person a meal, even though one is capable of doing so. Does later falling away from the habit of charity retroactively make your earlier action any less charitable? I don't think so.

"If the religious judgment is that 'Faithful Testimony of God' requires 'faithfulness', then by definition the action becomes negated when either the individual ceases to 'give testimony' or ceases to be 'faithful'--then, the action is not considered a religious action even though it may have at one point been considered moral. In the example of the meal, the action not only ceases to be a religious one, but it ceases to be moral as well."

Now it seems that you are redefining the action, which is why I must withdraw my agreement that it is a moral action.

If the action you're talking about is the testimony--and you said in your initial post "It is impossible to consider true and faithful testimony as an immoral act regardless of who is being testified of; giving testimony is an ethical and moral action because it facilitates justice," which is why I presumed so--then the action ends when that particular instance of testifying ends, and its character (religious, moral, or otherwise) can then be judged.

If the action you're talking about is a lifetime of remaining faithful to a religion--which is what you now seem to be saying--then I won't concede that that is a moral action, though I'll grant you that it is a religious one (or, at least, I can't think of a reason it wouldn't be).

e.s. kohen said...

Euthypro Said:
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If the action you're talking about is a lifetime of remaining faithful to a religion--which is what you now seem to be saying--then I won't concede that that is a moral action, though I'll grant you that it is a religious one (or, at least, I can't think of a reason it wouldn't be).


Elika Kohen Response:
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Why do you think this action is not moral?

I really really hope you are still out there. :)

e.s. kohen said...

"Euthypro" Said:
----------------------

Moving on to our discussion. The good news is, I think I finally understand your insistence that the action in question must be "religious," which I take to mean dictated and/or caused by religion. And, at least tentatively, I think I agree. You are certainly correct that Hitchens seems to have been using "believer" and "religious" to mean the same thing, and while I don't know that "demons" are the best illustration of this fact, the fact remains that they are not the same. They may or may not coincide to a large extent in practice, but that is of no moment.

It seems to me that this ambiguity (that's not quite the right term, but I can't think of a better one) may have affected our entire discussion thus far. I suspect (given your insistence on "religous action") you've been focusing on the religious aspect; I have been focused on belief. This might explain some of the feeling that we've been talking past each other.

Moreover, now that the ambiguity has been pointed out, I think you're right--that in context it makes no sense for Hitchens to be talking about believers as opposed to the religious. If you're criticizing religion, and your opponent is defending religion, you should be replying by discussing religion as well.

Furthermore, query whether this reduces the challenge to nothing. It seems that any purported moral action must either be moral solely because of its religious nature (such as prayer), and thus immediately dismissed by Hitchens as a non-action; or else it is moral because of some factor independent of religion (such as charity), and thus not really moral because it is religious, just coincidentally so.

In other words, if (like Hitchens) you do not allow for the possibility of moral actions which are moral solely because of their religious nature, then the challenge becomes circular, and while a conclusion reached by a circular argument may be true, the circular argument is not what proves it so.

e.s. kohen said...

Euthypro Said:
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If the action you're talking about is a lifetime of remaining faithful to a religion--which is what you now seem to be saying--then I won't concede that that is a moral action, though I'll grant you that it is a religious one (or, at least, I can't think of a reason it wouldn't be).


Elika Kohen Response:
------------------------
Why do you think this action is not moral?

I really really hope you are still out there. :)

keLston said...

How is "faithful testimony" in the religious context a moral action in the general context?

It is, in general, an amoral act. It is neither right nor wrong.

Furthermore, humanity is not alone in it's awareness of morality. Consider pack animals that share the kills from hunts.

e.s. kohen said...

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keLston said...
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How is "faithful testimony" in the religious context a moral action in the general context?

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e.s. Response...
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Thanks for your comment! The word "Faithful" implies trustworthy. And obviously, testimony is connotes a witness before a judge.

So, in a very general sense, any witness who faithfully provides true testimony, is generally considered a moral person.

Any person could perform the general action of providing faithful testimony, (if they truly are a witness). However, only a believer who has truly witnessed the actions of God could provide faithful testimony concerning God.

Again, the idea the Hitchens is asserting that believers claim that only believers are privy to the path of "morality" is quite the strawman.

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keLston said...
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It is, in general, an amoral act. It is neither right nor wrong.

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e.s. Response...
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My brain kind of locked up when I read this. On one hand I was thinking, "If faithfully testifying before a judge and jury cannot be considered 'moral', then what in the world could be considered truly moral?"

On the otherhand, I think it is an awesome question to state what is moral and immoral or amoral in a quantifiable way. I think I can actually do this. But, not here. :) Okay, I am working on a blog post called "Morality".

But, for a quick easy answer, I think most people everywhere would consider a person telling a truth, especially in the context of a judgement, particularly moral--especially if that testimony is given at their own detriment.

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keLston said...
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Furthermore, humanity is not alone in it's awareness of morality. Consider pack animals that share the kills from hunts.

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e.s. Response...
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I think you are arguing my point, that morality is readily apparent, by believer and unbeliever.

However, I think the pack animals analogy is going a little too far. This is an argument from silence for the most part: Is there some internal voice, sentience, within animals that helps them determine what is justified or not? What is Good? What is Evil? What is right? What is wrong?

I can't go there, because I don't know. But, I suspect most people can't really prove that one. :)

keLston said...

The problem I have with "faithful testimony" defined as it is is likely the same reason that "eyewitness testimony", while considered the highest form of evidence in the court of law is the lowest form of evidence in the court of science. If you gave faithful testimony regarding the actions of God, are you giving actual faithful testimony or are you demonstrating your propensity to believe in a god? A child, for instance, could give faithful testimony when asked about Santa or the Tooth Fairy. Is this a moral action? If you are convinced beyond the shadow of a doubt of what could be a lie, does faithful testimony only accept what you view as truth or what is actually provably true?

I don't believe Hitchens's argument is a strawman. In his debate with Frank Turek, it is Turek that counters the morality argument by asking something along the lines of: "How do you know right or wrong without God or an external being to compare it to?"

So the question is: Is the inner witness not enough? Are there universal truths? After all, in the views of modern morality, many would argue homosexuality is immoral. However, in Ancient Greece, homosexuality could be considered the most ethical, the most moral form of love. So if there are universal truths, how does the "knowledge" of morality address the shifting values of society in terms of what is moral?

From what we, as a whole, would view as moral, a pack animal which shares the trophy of the hunt with his/her pack is performing a moral act. Does one have to be aware of morality to perform a moral act?

e.s. kohen said...

Splitting up response into three replies:

Part 1 of 3

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keLston said...
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The problem I have with "faithful testimony" defined as it is is likely the same reason that "eyewitness testimony", while considered the highest form of evidence in the court of law is the lowest form of evidence in the court of science.

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e.s. Response...
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I really love comments like yours. :) I was up pretty late last night, and trying to figure out what I wrote, (in several different blogs. So far, your comment has been way more intelligent than all mine put together. *sigh).

I understand the notion of quantifiable, scientific, evidence, etc. I love it a lot. In fact, I believe that any argument to prove the existence of God should be done in a quantifiable way, as there is no other precedent historically in Scripture or ancient believers to do otherwise.

However, that being said ... Hitchens argument seems to go ahead and concede the existence of God, and pursues the topic in a very personal, social manner, rather than arguing from lab science.

So, for this reason, my response to Hitchens does not rest on science, but rather simple reason.

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keLston said...
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If you gave faithful testimony regarding the actions of God, are you giving actual faithful testimony or are you demonstrating your propensity to believe in a god? A child, for instance, could give faithful testimony when asked about Santa or the Tooth Fairy. Is this a moral action? If you are convinced beyond the shadow of a doubt of what could be a lie, does faithful testimony only accept what you view as truth or what is actually provably true?

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e.s. Response...
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Again, my argument is from the point of view that someone is actually a true witness. They have actually seen, heard, tasted, smelled. Not someone full of wishful thinking. For example, what Moses claimed to have happened is a lot different than the warm fuzzy "spiritual experience" that both Jews and Christians claim today. What the disciples claim to have experienced is a lot different too.

Many people, The prophets, the early Church writers, regular people, were literally put on the stand because of what they claimed to have seen and heard. If a credible witness is recounting an actual truth, then yes, this action certainly seems to be moral. But Hitchens question is also hypothetical. He didn't ask, "What moral action do believers do, that unbelievers cannot." That would be a really good question, but also and ad-hominem. But ironically, ad-hominem is perfectly legitimate in this particular argument.

Splitting up response into two replies:

e.s. kohen said...

Part 2 of 3

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keLston said...
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I don't believe Hitchens's argument is a strawman. In his debate with Frank Turek, it is Turek that counters the morality argument by asking something along the lines of: "How do you know right or wrong without God or an external being to compare it to?"

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e.s. Response...
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Frank Turek is a man, a single man. And does not represent the entirety of "believerdom". In my opinion, Hitchens is probably debating with Turek probably because Turek is "good sport". In other words, I believe Hitchens is "cherry picking" a liberal theist to prove his point. There wouldn't be any "fame" or "interest" if he debated with me, or another conservative theist. It is certainly true that I am probably a lot less entertaining. :)

That being said, I cannot represent the entirety of "believerdom" either. However, what I can do is try to represent history and Scripture with integrity. I can say, "See look! Both Judaism and Christianity have *historically argued that the existence of God is quantifiable and evident, and that faith should be established on the evidentual power of God, and not warm fuzzy feelings. And look! Historically, both have always argued that morality is readily apparent to all people."

So, by misrepresenting actual history, Scripture, and the majority of believers that actually try to immitate God ... yes, it is a strawman, by definition.

e.s. kohen said...

Part 3 of 3

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keLston said...
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So the question is: Is the inner witness not enough? Are there universal truths? After all, in the views of modern morality, many would argue homosexuality is immoral. However, in Ancient Greece, homosexuality could be considered the most ethical, the most moral form of love. So if there are universal truths, how does the "knowledge" of morality address the shifting values of society in terms of what is moral?

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e.s. Response...
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Just like someone else, you are provoking me into giving a quantifiable measuring stick of what is moral or not. Further, you are specifically asking whether or not morality shifts over time, or if it is concrete but that it is our perception of morality that shifts. But, I am not sure if it is relavent in proving that Hitchens' argument is not a strawman.

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keLston said...
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From what we, as a whole, would view as moral, a pack animal which shares the trophy of the hunt with his/her pack is performing a moral act. Does one have to be aware of morality to perform a moral act?

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e.s. Response...
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In short, it is impossible to claim from Scripture, or from ancient Judaism and Christiantiy, and modern non-elitist theology, that one has to be aware of morality to perform a moral act.

I cannot argue, from Scripture or ancient historical precedent, that Judaism or Christianity incorporate the idea that moral acts are limited to those that "are aware" or to those that are religious. I am fairly certain noone can make that argument with integrity.

So, to say that believers believe that awareness of religion, or awareness of God, are required to act morally is a massive misrepresentation, and truly an invalid argument.

e.s. kohen said...

P.S. I did send an email request to Frank Turek asking for his thoughts. I haven't heard back from him yet, but I really hope he will. It would be awesome to know his thoughts.

e.s. kohen said...

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keLston said ...
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I don't believe Hitchens's argument is a strawman. In his debate with Frank Turek, it is Turek that counters the morality argument by asking something along the lines of: "How do you know right or wrong without God or an external being to compare it to?"

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e.s. Response
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Turek repeatedly states, several times, that you don't need God or religion to know what is moral or not. He says it again in his closing comments on the first debate.

However, what Turek does challenge Hitchens on is how Hitchens can "know" for certain what is moral or not, without some standard for morality. In essence, "how can materialism provide a viable moral standard?"

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